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Introduction   
Have you ever had the feeling that someone was staring at you and turned around to 
find this was the case? This may have been an example of scopaesthesia (Carpenter, 
2005), the name given to describe the phenomena in which one can detect they are 
being stared at by another, not directly in their field of vision (Colwell et al., 2000). 
Personal experience of scopaesthesia has been shown to be highly prevalent across 
various populations; surveys conducted in Europe and North America evidenced 
between 70% and 97% of the people questioned reported they had experienced 
scopaesthesia in some form (Braud et al., 1990; Sheldrake, 1994; Cottrell et al., 1996). 
Further surveys suggest that women (81%) experience scopaesthesia more so than 
men (74%) and outlined scopaesthesia occurred most frequently with strangers in 
public places (Sheldrake, 2003). Anecdotal evidence of scopaesthesia has remained 
seemingly high since the existence of phenomenon was first proposed over a century 
ago. Naturally, this has prompted scientific enquiry.   
Previous Research   
The earliest investigation into scopaesthesia is believed to have been conducted by 
Titchener (1898), after several of his students discussed their belief in the 
phenomenon with him. Titchener dismissed the students’ propositions, stating it as 
mere superstition. As he predicted, his laboratory experiments investigating 
scopaesthesia, provided no effect. However, Hodgson (1899) highlighted how 
Titchener’s research displayed an evident bias, in order to confirm his own prior belief 
that the phenomenon was unscientific. Furthermore, the details and methodology of 
these experiments were never provided, meaning findings are potentially unreliable  
(Sheldrake, 2005).   
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Although heavily scrutinised, Titchener’s paper was influential in providing a 
foundation of interest into the phenomenon (Sheldrake, 2005). As a result, a 
substantial number of experiments have now been conducted to further investigate 
scopaesthesia. These experiments, referred to as ‘direct-looking’ experiments, involve 
an experimenter sitting behind the participant, either staring directly at their backs or 
looking away (Baker, 2007). The participant is asked to clarify if they believe they are 
being stared at or not, this is repeated over a number of trials with responses recorded. 
Overall, statistically significant staring detection effects have been obtained across 
multiple studies (Braud, 2005), with several meta-analyses indicating the validity and 
reliability of scopaesthesia (Schlitz and Braud, 1997; Schmidt et al., 2004). The ease 
of conducting these types of experiments mean that similar positive findings have been 
replicated in tens of thousands of trials, further enhancing the statistical significance 
of the results (Sheldrake, 2005).  
Methodological Issues   
Some researchers however, are sceptical about the methods in which these findings 
have been gained. Marks and Colwell (2001), described how direct-looking  
experiments were poorly controlled, remarking even after twenty million trials, findings 
would still count for nothing; ‘the quality of evidence is much more important than its 
quantity’ (Marks and Colwell, 2001:62). Possible confounds within scopaesthesia 
experiments have been proposed, these include peripheral vision and sensory cues 
such as subtle noises and variations in infrared radiation (Sheldrake, 2005; Baker, 
2007). In an attempt to eradicate these confounds, different experimental designs 
have been introduced. These involve blindfolding participants (Sheldrake, 2001) or 
separating participant and experimenter by mediums such as one-way mirrors  
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(Peterson, 1978) or closed-circuit television (CCTV) (Braud et al., 1993).   
However, this is where scopaesthesia research has seemingly hit a dead-end. The 
need for control over extraneous variables means that the ecological validity of 
scopaesthesia experiments suffer. Baker (2005) presented a ‘Continuum of remote 
staring detection studies’ to evidence this (See Fig. 1). Direct-looking experiments 
provide a greater ecological validity compared to other experimental designs, as they 
are closest to the real world situation in which scopaesthesia could occur. However, 
potential confounds are not controlled for like they would be in a CCTV 
laboratorybased experiment. This poses the problem of how the controls used in these 
experiments, may restrict true investigation of the real life phenomenon.  
 
Figure 1. Continuum of remote staring detection studies (from Baker, 2005)  
  
Additionally, the existence of scopaesthesia cannot be explained in terms of 
contemporary science, with current knowledge of sensory mechanisms providing no 
plausible explanation of how scopaesthesia could operate (Baker, 2005). As a result 
of this, scopaesthesia is classed as paranormal, considered experimentally as a form 
of extrasensory perception (ESP) (Sheldrake, 2005). This categorisation causes 
scopaesthesia research to be subject to the general taboo against psychic phenomena 
(Sheldrake, 2013), with some marginalising parapsychological research as an 
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illegitimate scientific undertaking (Irwin, 1993). This creates further difficulties when 
investigating scopaesthesia as, if authentic, the phenomenon contradicts modern-day 
science, meaning studies must to be subject to stringent methodology.   
The present study   
With these experimental difficulties in mind, the present study instead aims to gain 
further insight using a different approach; by focusing on the reasons why people 
accept and endorse scopaesthesia and view scopaesthesia experiences as authentic.  
A closer focus into the relationship between belief in scopaesthesia and experience of 
scopaesthesia is needed, as previous studies identifying correlates of scopaesthesia 
may have confounded these two factors. Take this example question used in past 
studies (Sheldrake, 2013); ‘Have you ever found that you could stare at someone from 
behind and make them turn around?’ A participant may have experienced this but 
believed their stare was detected by peripheral vision, not by an ability to detect a gaze 
outside the range of conventional senses. The respondent may answer yes to this 
question, without actually endorsing scopaesthesia, giving rise to compromised  
findings.   
The survey of anomalous experience (SAE) (Irwin, 2013) addresses this issue, as it 
delineates clearly between anomalous experiences and paranormal experiences. 
Respondents are assessed on both their proneness to anomalous experiences (PAE) 
and proneness to paranormal attribution (PPA). Individuals can identify an experience 
as anomalous, this experience then may or may not be classified as paranormal. With 
this is in mind, it seemed necessary firstly to assess participants’ level of paranormal 
belief, as this may influence individuals to classify a subjective experience as 
scopaesthesia.    
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Paranormal Belief   
Research into psychological correlates of scopaesthesia is very limited, but belief in 
the paranormal is one that has been investigated more so than others (Baker, 2007). 
Findings however, have been inconclusive. Williams (1983) assessed participant’s 
level of paranormal belief using the 10-item sheep-goat scale. From this assessment, 
he chose a sample of half believers and half non-believers; evidence outlined a 
positive correlation between scopaesthesia detection and paranormal belief. This 
correlation would be expected as ESP experiences, which includes scopaesthesia, 
have been found to be influenced by a generalised belief in paranormal phenomena  
(Rattet and Bursik, 2001). However, self-selected samples such as the one used by  
Williams, pose concerns about the ability to derive general inferences from (Wainer, 
2013). In light of William’s sample not being completely random, validity of the findings 
come into question. Moreover, the direct-looking experiments conducted by Coover 
(1913) included only believers in the paranormal as participants, but reported largely 
insignificant results. Additionally, a study conducted by Wiseman et al (1995) 
demonstrated a significant negative correlation between a measure of psi-belief and a 
scopaesthesia measure. With mixed results regarding correlations between 
paranormal belief and scopaesthesia, further research on the relationship is needed.    
Cognitive-perceptual factors  
As the present study sought to investigate the processes through which belief in 
scopaesthesia can be formed, testing cognitive-perceptual factors as potential 
correlates was deemed appropriate.   
In accordance with Langdon and Coltheart’s (2000) account of generation and 
evaluation of beliefs, explanations of sensory experiences are devised according to a 
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person’s individual idiosyncrasies and universal human dispositions (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1972; Weiner, 1986). This evaluative process is termed ‘reality testing’ 
(Reber, 1995). Sometimes, individuals may possess proneness to reality testing 
deficits, whereby information about the environment is not subject to rational thought 
processes (Irwin, 2004). Alternatively, an intuitive-experiential thinking style is adopted 
(Dagnall et al., 2017), experiences do not undergo rigorous critical evaluation and 
instead causal attributions are produced using self-generated hypotheses (Drinkwater 
et al., 2012). Links between the general endorsement of anomalous beliefs and 
intuitive-experiential thinking have been shown previously (Dagnall et al., 2010, Irwin, 
2003). Additionally, Pennycook et al (2012) found participants who demonstrated 
higher levels of analytic reasoning were less likely to validate supernatural beliefs. 
Therefore, it can be postulated that belief in scopaesthesia may occur from a lack of 
rational testing of subjective experiences. Belief in scopaesthesia may be maintained 
over time as individuals repeatedly fail to test their own interpretations of anomalous 
events (Goode, 2000).  
A second cognitive-perceptual factor chosen, was a measure of schizotypy.  
Schizotypy is a complex, multidimensional psychological construct (Lenzenweger,  
2015), comprising of cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal and disorganised dimensions 
(Dembinska-Krajewska and Rybakowski, 2014). Several models of schizotypy exist 
due to its application within various psychology sub-disciplines, for example; individual 
differences (Eysenck, 1960) and clinical settings (Rado, 1953; Meehl, 1962). The 
present study adopted the fully dimensional model proposed by Claridge (1997), which 
views schizotypy as a personality dimension. This ideology places individuals on a 
continuum between relative psychological health and psychosis (Barrantes-Vidal et 
al., 2015). Those reporting higher levels of schizotypy display, to a milder degree, 
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tendencies for schizophrenia-like characteristics. Previous studies investigating 
schizotypy as a correlate to anomalous belief, also employed the personality 
perspective, therefore this model was deemed the most suitable (Dagnall et al., 2016, 
2017; Denovan et al., 2018).  
Numerous studies note respondents scoring high on the cognitive-perceptual function 
within schizotypy, show a stronger belief in anomalous phenomena (Hergovich et al., 
2008; Simmonds-Moore, 2010). In addition, although cognitive-perceptual factors 
have largely been untested as predictors of scopaesthesia, Sheldrake (2005), 
mentions an unpublished thesis (Jones, 1996) which investigated automatic detection 
of scopaesthesia and schizotypal personality correlates. Findings outlined a higher 
level of arousal in participants with higher scores of schizotypy when they were being 
stared at from behind, compared to when they were not being stared at. Low scorers 
on the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire did not differ in arousal levels.   
It must be noted that the validity and reliability of these findings should be interpreted 
with caution, as the study was not peer-reviewed and no replications have been found. 
This said, further conclusions from this study have been drawn by Atkinson (2005). He 
suggested people with schizotypal tendencies manifest an amplified reasoning bias 
which could affect scopaesthesia belief. Evidence of biased attention and memory of 
experiences associated with personal threat is present in persecutory delusions, 
experienced by individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia (Bentall et al., 1995; Kaney 
et al., 1997). According to personality models of schizotypy, this bias would still be 
present in non-clinical populations.  In this context, those possessing higher levels of 
schizotypy are more likely to remember occasions in which they detected another 
person’s stare, but forget times where they believed they were being stared at but 
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turned around to find this was not the case. This biased memory can endorse a greater 
belief in scopaesthesia.   
Contrastingly, Jone’s (1996) findings could be interpreted in a different manner; people 
who reported high levels of schizotypy may be more sensitive to the gaze of the starer 
through the unknown way in which it is transmitted. It has been suggested that the 
ability to detect remote stares may be present across the population in varying degrees 
(Sheldrake, 1994; Braud, 2005) and studies have shown that high levels of positive 
schizotypy are linked with enhanced cognitive experiences (Mohr and Claridge, 2015).  
A study conducted by Rock et al (2008), demonstrated those scoring higher on positive 
schizotypy reported more intense levels of perceptual experiences, suggesting a 
possible greater ability to detect scopaesthesia.   
Research rationale   
Most previous scopaesthesia research has focused on providing experimental proof 
for the validity of the phenomenon. For reasons mentioned previously, this approach 
appears to be proving unproductive. These studies, however, have obtained 
numerous positive effects, sufficient to warrant further research into the topic. The 
present study will instead explore the nature of scopaesthesia, investigating factors 
which could potentially influence personal belief in the phenomenon. The aim is to 
build on the small evidence base of psychological correlates for scopaesthesia, as 
investigating previously overlooked and unexplored personality factors is crucial for a 
deeper understanding of the phenomenon. In a wider context, understanding how 
psychological factors relate to scopaesthesia may be useful in a clinical setting, 
potentially helping those with paranoid or self-conscious thoughts.    
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Research Question  
To examine the extent to which belief in the paranormal and cognitive-perceptual 
personality measures relate to belief in scopaesthesia.  
Research Hypotheses  
H1-H3  
Paranormal belief, proneness to reality testing deficits and schizotypy will correlate 
positively with belief in scopaesthesia.  
H4  
On the survey of anomalous experience, belief in scopaesthesia will correlate 
positively with only proneness to anomalous experiences scores (proneness to 
paranormal attribution scores will not significantly correlate with belief in 
scopaesthesia).  
H5  
Belief in scopaesthesia will correlate positively with experience of scopaesthesia.  
H6   
Women will present a greater level of belief in scopaesthesia than men.  
  
Method   
Design   
This study employed a correlation survey design. Relationships between the 
dependent variable - belief in scopaesthesia, and independent variables – paranormal 
Page 14 of 44  
  
belief, proneness to reality testing deficits and schizotypy were presented. The extent 
to which independent variables predicted the dependent variable was also calculated.   
Participants  
In total, 173 respondents recruited through convenience sampling, participated in the 
study1. Mean overall age was 29.73 years (SD = 13.02), with a range of 18–69 years; 
male (N = 40, 23%) M = 34.52, range 18–69 years SD = 17.10, female (N = 133, 77%) 
M = 28.30, range 18–66 years SD = 11.20. Exclusion criteria indicated participants 
were required to be over the age of 18. Questionnaires were completed either via 
physical paper hand-out or through an online link published on the Manchester 
Metropolitan Participation Pool or a private Facebook group containing students and 
staff at Manchester Metropolitan University.  
Materials  
Previous studies investigating psychological correlates of scopaesthesia outlined the 
use of questionnaires in data collection (Williams, 1983; Fenigstein and Vanable, 
1992; Braud et al., 1993). Thus questionnaires were considered an appropriate 
methodology for this study. All participants were asked to complete the same 
questionnaire booklet containing 97 items across all variables (see appendix 2). The 
scopaesthesia measure used in the questionnaire was devised especially for the 
purposes of the present study. All other items within the questionnaire were previously 
established measures. Questionnaire booklets also contained demographic  
information including age and gender. To control for order effects, questionnaire order 
was counter balanced.  
                                                          
1 In accordance with the calculation provided by Green (1991), the minimum number of participants 
required for the present study was 107; minimum number of participants required is 104 + k (where k 
is the number of predictor variables).  
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Scopaesthesia Questionnaire (SQ)  
Containing nine items overall, this self-report measure assessed belief in 
scopaesthesia (5 items) and experience of scopaesthesia (4 items). Within the belief 
in scopaesthesia sub-section, respondents were given statements such as “I believe 
in the existence of scopaesthesia” and answered using a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 - “strongly disagree” to 7 - “strongly agree”. Total scores could range from 6 to 
42, higher scores suggested a greater belief in scopaesthesia. Items 3 and 5 in this 
section are negatively-keyed items, questions were worded in this way in order to 
prevent response bias by participants (Paulhus, 1991). The belief in scopaesthesia 
sub-section showed a good internal consistency (.76) when tested in the present 
study. The experience of scopaesthesia sub-scale aimed to investigate if participants 
had experienced scopaesthesia and if so where, who and how frequently. This section 
was useful in order to provide descriptive information concerning scopaesthesia 
experiences.    
The Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS)  
The R-PBS (Tobacyk, 1988) is a revision of the original Paranormal Belief Scale 
developed by Tobacyk and Milford (1983). It is a 26-item self-report measure 
assessing seven facets of paranormal belief; traditional religious belief, psi, witchcraft, 
superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms, and precognition (Tobacyk, 2004).  
Items are presented as statements such as “There is life on other planets”.  
Respondents answer using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 - “strongly disagree” 
to 7 - “strongly agree”. The R-PBS calculates an overall paranormal belief via 
summated item totals, scores can range from 26 to 170, with higher scores outlining 
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greater paranormal belief. Note that, item 23, “Mind reading is not possible” is reversed 
scored.  
Although dimensions of the sub-scales within the PBS have been disputed (Wiseman 
and Watt, 2006), previous research has established the R-PBS as psychometrically 
and conceptually satisfactory (Tobacyk, 2004). Test–retest reliability of the scale 
across a four week period was shown to be .89, with test-retest reliability of the seven 
subscales ranging from .60 to .87. Subscale reliability coefficients have been found to 
range from .60 (precognition) to .84 (psi) (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). The R-PBS is the 
most prevalently used self-report measure of paranormal belief (Irwin, 2004) so was 
deemed suitable for the present study.   
The Inventory of Personality Organization Reality Testing Subscale (IPO-RT)  
Proneness to RT deficits was measured using the 20-item reality testing subscale of 
the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO–RT; Lenzenweger et al., 2001). This 
one-dimensional self-report measure is designed to index “the capacity to differentiate 
self from non-self, intrapsychic from external stimuli, and to maintain empathy with 
ordinary social criteria of reality” (Kernberg, 1996:120). This view is consistent with the 
theory of belief generation proposed by Langdon and Coltheart (2000), who focused 
on information-processing style rather than psychotic symptomatology. Example items 
are statements such as “I have seen things which do not exist in reality”, which are 
responded to using a 5-point Likert scale; 1 = ‘never true’, to 5 = ‘always true’. A total 
score is calculated as the sum of responses over all items, which may range from 20 
to 100, with higher scores suggesting greater proneness to RT deficits. The 
psychometric characteristics of the scale are well-established, showing good internal 
consistently, good construct validity and sufficient retest reliability score of r = .73 
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(Lenzenweger et al., 2001). The IPO-RT has been found to be temporally stable with 
nonclinical populations and although IPO-RT items have not been tested for differential 
item functioning, it has been evidenced that scores do not vary across gender 
(Lenzenweger et al., 2001).  
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire Brief (SPQ-B)   
The SPQ-B (Raine and Benishay, 1995) is a shortened version of the original 74-item 
SPQ (Raine, 1991), which was developed to screen for schizotypal personality 
disorder in non-clinical samples (APA, 1994). Partially modelled after three 
components of schizophrenia, SPQ dimensions include: cognitive-perceptual deficits  
(Ideas of Reference, Magical Thinking, Unusual Perceptual Experiences, and 
Paranoid Ideation), interpersonal deficits (Social Anxiety, No Close Friends, Blunted  
Affect, Paranoid Ideation), and disorganisation (Odd Behaviour, Odd Speech). The 
SPQ-B still includes these three subscales, but is comprised of 22 items only; eight 
items assessing cognitive-perceptual, eight items assessing interpersonal and six 
items assessing disorganised. The SPQ-B contains statements such as “I am an odd, 
unusual person” responded to with “yes” or “no” answers. Yes-responses are totalled, 
producing an overall score ranging from 0 to 22, higher scores specify higher levels of 
self-reported schizotypy. Favoured over the SPQ for its brevity, the SPQ-B features 
prominently within published research (Bailey and Swallow, 2004). The SPQ-B, 
demonstrates psychometric integrity; specifically, criterion validity, good internal 
consistency (subscales range from 0.74 to 0.76) and test–retest reliability (Raine and 
Benishay, 1995; Axelrod et al., 2001).  
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The Survey of Anomalous Experiences (SAE)   
The SAE was constructed by Irwin et al (2013) and comprises of 20 items evaluating 
anomalous experiences. This self-report measure aims to evidence the difference 
between an anomalous experience and parapsychological experience. Limitations of 
previous measurements of parapsychological experience such as the Anomalous 
Experiences Inventory (Kumar & Pekala, 2001) (one of the most currently widely used 
inventories for surveying parapsychological experiences (Goulding & Parker, 2001), 
are that some items refer to anomalous experiences explicitly implicating paranormal 
phenomena. For example; “I have seen a ghost or apparition”. This means 
respondents are forced to attribute an anomalous experience to one that is 
paranormal, even if this is not the case. This may cause respondents to identify as 
non-experients, answering “no” as they deny ever having any paranormal affiliated 
experiences, yet an independent observer may construe some of the respondents’ 
experiences as parapsychological. This may create compromised findings.   
In the SAE, participants who acknowledge having had an anomalous experience are 
asked to further clarify their position by stating whether they attributed their experience 
to a specified paranormal process or to a specified non-paranormal process, like 
coincidence or misperception. Each item outlines an anomalous experience, 
presented without any explicit reference to paranormal underpinnings. Statements 
such as “I have inherent abilities that neither of my (biological) parents possessed” are 
introduced to participants, responded to in three ways; Option 1 “yes, I interpreted it 
as a (specified) paranormal experience”, Option 2 “yes, but I interpreted it as due to 
(specified) normal processes”, or Option 3 “no.”. Option 1 and 2 show a proneness to 
anomalous experiences (PAE) whereas a selection of option 3 suggests no such 
proneness. Proneness to paranormal attribution (PPA) is shown by participant 
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selection of option 1. The SAE yields two scores for each participant; firstly, a PAE 
score is computed as the percentage of “yes” responses (i.e., selection of option 1 or  
2 in any item). Secondly, each participant’s PPA score is defined by the percentage 
of  
“yes, paranormal” (Option 1) responses. Both scores can range from 0% to 100%. 
Validity of the SAE proved sufficient in a study conducted by Irwin (2015), additionally, 
considering the experiences surveyed within the items vary widely in frequency, 
internal consistency of the scale is satisfactory (0.83) (Irwin et al., 2013).  
Procedure and Ethical Considerations   
Ethical approval was gained before any data was collected (see appendix 1). This 
adheres to the ethical guidelines outlined by the British Psychological Society (BPS) 
as well as complying with Manchester Metropolitan University’s Academic Ethical 
Framework and the University’s Guidelines for Good Research Practice.   
Potential respondents were first presented with the participant information sheet, this 
included study background information, participant requirements and participant 
confidentially. All participants were made aware of the true aims of the study before 
beginning the questionnaire and no deception occurred during any point of the study. 
Participants were requested to create a unique five number identification code, in order 
to enable them the right to withdraw at any point during the research process. 
Participants were only made identifiable by this unique code, gender and age of 
participants was asked, however no personal information was requested during any 
stage of the study. Full consent was explained and gained via the consent form. 
Respondents then continued on into the questionnaire booklet comprised of the 
several self-report measures. Following completion of the questionnaire booklet, 
participants were debriefed. In this, their right to withdraw was explained and although 
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the study does not at any point, place participants in potentially harmful or stressful 
situations, services were listed if any distress was encountered as a result of the study 
(see appendix 2 for participant information sheet, consent form and debrief).  
  
Results   
Participant’s responses from paper questionnaires were inputted into Excel and online 
responses were exported from Qualtrics. Both were added into SPSS for further 
analysis.   
Data Preparation  
Prior to analysis, all scales were prepared from raw data on SPSS. The following items 
were reversed;  
Scopaesthesia – Belief in Scopaesthesia: Q3 and Q5.  
Paranormal Belief – Revised Paranormal Belief Scale: Q23  
Reliability Analysis and Descriptive Statistics  
Following internal consistency analysis, measures for Scopaesthesia, Paranormal 
belief, Reality testing, Schizotypy and both components of the Survey of Anomalous 
Experience were deemed reliable, showing Cronbach’s alpha’s above .7. Means and 
standard deviations for each of the measures was also calculated (see Table 1).  
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Table 1  
Scale descriptive statistics and reliabilities  
  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Number  
of items  
Cronbach’s   
alpha  
Scopaesthesia  
Belief   
  
22.70  
  
5.48  
  
5.00  
  
35.00  
  
5  
    
.76    
Experience   5.11  1.98  1.00  7.00  4      
Paranormal Belief   86.36  34.62  26.00  170.00  26  .95    
CognitivePerceptual  
Reality Testing  
  
43.42  
  
13.85  
  
20.00  
  
81.00  
  
20  
    
.93    
Schizotypy  9.19  5.07  0.00  22.00  22  .84    
SAE          20  .88    
PAE  44.31  20.44  0.00  100.00        
PPA  23.97  29.73  0.00  100.00        
Note. The measure of Scopaesthesia was divided into Belief in Scopaesthesia (Belief) 
and Experience of Scopaesthesia (Experience). The Survey of Anomalous Experience  
(SAE) was also divided into Proneness to anomalous experience (PAE) and 
Proneness to paranormal attribution (PPA).  
Scopaesthesia, Paranormal Belief and Cognitive-Perceptual Correlations  
A series of Pearson’s bivariate correlations were conducted between all scales used 
in the study (see Table 2).  
  
  
  
Page 22 of 44  
  
  
Table 2  
Correlations among variables related to Scopaesthesia  
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
1. BSCOP  
2. ESCOP   
  
.71**  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
    
3. PB   .29**  .10            
4. RT  .13*  -.01  .29**          
5. S  .17*  .11  .34**  .66**        
6. PAE  .09  .10  .29**  .62**  .56**      
7. PPA  .44*  .20**  .44**  .44**  .45**  .43**    
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.,one-tailed. BSCOP = Belief in scopaesthesia, ESCOP = 
Experience of scopaesthesia, PB = Paranormal Belief, RT = Reality Testing, S = 
Schizotypy, PAE = Proneness to anomalous experience, PPA = Proneness to  
paranormal attribution.  
Belief in scopaesthesia shows a positive correlation with all of the independent 
variables, with paranormal belief showing the highest positive correlation.  
 From the correlation matrix, it was shown that belief in scopaesthesia and experience 
of scopaesthesia have a strong correlation.  
Regression analysis   
Regression analysis was used to test if paranormal belief, reality testing and 
schizotypy predicted participants’ belief in scopaesthesia. Forward selection was 
used, as it enters predictor variables individually, in an order determined by the 
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relationship strength between predictor and criterion. This enables the effects of 
adding subsequent variables to be identified. Using this method, a significant model 
emerged (F (1,118) = 15.6 p <.001). The relationship between paranormal belief and 
belief in scopaesthesia was small (R=.29), with the model explaining approximately 
8% (adjusted R² = 0.7%) variance in belief in scopaesthesia scores. These results are 
summarised below in Table 3.  
  
Table 3  
Regression Analysis predictors of belief in scopaesthesia  
Variable   B  β  T  Sig. (p)  
Paranormal Belief   .04  .29  4.00  <.001  
Note. 𝑅²= .78 (8% variance) (Reality testing and Schizotypy were not significant 
predictors in this model).    
Descriptive Statistics for Experience of Scopaesthesia  
Results outlined that 75.8% of participants reported a personal experience of 
scopaesthesia. Within the number of times participants had experienced 
scopaesthesia, 2-5 times was outlined as the most common frequency of 
scopaesthesia experiences (48.6%). In addition, strangers were highlighted as the 
type of people that scopaesthesia was experienced the most with (60.1%). Public 
transport was reported as the location where scopaesthesia had been experienced the 
most (see Table 4).  
  
  
  
  
Table 4  
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Locations of scopaesthesia experiences and percentages   
Location   Percentage (%)  
Public Transport  32.4  
Other  15.6  
Workplace   13.9  
In a vehicle  11.6  
Home  10.4  
Restaurant  8.1  
Shopping Mall  8.1  
  
Gender Differences in Scopaesthesia Belief  
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare belief in scopaesthesia in 
males and females. Equal variances could not be assumed due to an unequal sample 
(Male, N = 40 and Female, N = 133). Women (M = 23, SD = 5.0) reported significantly 
higher levels of belief in scopaesthesia than men (M = 21, SD = 6.5), t(53.67) = -2.00 
, p = .054.  
Note. Following the independent samples t test, the significant level for belief in 
scopaesthesia was .054, which is above the generally accepted level of p < 0.5. 
Although belief in scopaesthesia did not have a significant level below the test value 
of .05, it was still used in further analysis due to being close to the acceptable test 
value.  
Summary of findings  
Paranormal belief and cognitive-perceptual measures evidenced significant positive 
correlations with belief in scopaesthesia. However, only the measure of paranormal 
belief was shown to be a significant predictor of belief in scopaesthesia, explaining 8% 
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of the variance. Both reality testing and schizotypy were not significant predictors of 
scopaesthesia belief and did not account for any additional variance. Additionally, PAE 
scores from the SAE positively correlated with scopaesthesia belief, further showing a 
relationship between paranormal belief and belief in scopaesthesia.  
  
Discussion  
Present research findings  
The present study aimed to explore factors which could influence an individual’s belief 
in scopaesthesia. The findings support all six hypotheses posed at the beginning of 
the study.  
As predicted, paranormal belief and both cognitive-perceptual personality measures 
showed positive correlations with belief in scopaesthesia (H1-H3). The measure of 
paranormal belief was found to be the highest correlate, being the only variable which 
emerged as a significant predictor of belief in scopaesthesia. This supports the view 
that belief in the paranormal can act as a framework in interpreting unusual 
perceptions and experiences (Rattet and Bursik, 2001); concurring also with Williams 
(1983), who evidenced a positive correlation between scopaesthesia and paranormal  
belief.   
These findings however, do not support results obtained by Coover (1913) and  
Wiseman et al (1995); with Wiseman evidencing a negative correlation between 
paranormal belief and scopaesthesia. These contrasting findings may be explained 
due to experimenter effects (Rosenthal, 1976). Experimenter effects are common 
within parapsychology research and refer to the impacts the experimenter creates 
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whilst conducting investigations (Palmer, 1989a, b). This could be the way in which 
they interact with the participant (Baker, 2007) or even the experimenter’s own psi 
abilities (Watt and Ramakers, 2003). Both Coover and Wiseman outlined disbelief in 
the phenomenon and throughout past scopaesthesia research, there is a clear trend 
of sceptics gaining negative results in studies where they acted as the experimenter. 
In contrast, findings gained by experimenters holding non-sceptical attitudes present 
a majority of significantly positive results (Sheldrake, 1999).   
These opposing findings, however, may not be due to experimenter effects, but instead 
caused by the ‘file drawer effect’ (Rosenthal, 1979). This bias is the tendency to only 
publish positive results, leaving negative or non-confirmatory results unpublished. It 
may be that if all the unsuccessful investigations of scopaesthesia were published then 
positive and negative effects would be equally reported (Henry, 2005), regardless of 
the attitudes of the experimenter. In order to explore the possibility of experimenter 
effects in scopaesthesia research, a collection of collaborative scepticproponent 
studies was conducted by Schlitz and Wiseman (2006). Findings partially outlined 
experimenter effects, but they concluded that more research is needed before 
experimenter effects can be validated.   
Further support for paranormal belief as a predictor to belief in scopaesthesia was 
shown via the SAE; through a positive correlation between proneness to paranormal 
attribution scores and scopaesthesia belief (H4). It may be that those reporting a belief 
in scopaesthesia may have a tendency to interpret subjective experiences as 
paranormal, instead of other potential available explanations. As predicted, PAE 
scores did not significantly correlate with belief in scopaesthesia.  
Page 27 of 44  
  
Although cognitive-perceptual personality measures did not emerge as significant 
predictors in the regression analysis, both proneness to reality testing deficits and 
schizotypy correlated positively with scopaesthesia belief. These findings are 
consistent with previous research suggesting that paranormal beliefs can arise from a 
deficiency in subjecting inferences to critical rational processing (Irwin, 2003; Dagnall 
et al., 2010; Pennycook et al., 2012). Furthermore, the positive correlation between 
scopaesthesia belief and schizotypy supports the theory proposed by Atkinson (2005); 
that higher levels of schizotypy can create a proneness to confirmation bias, neglecting 
disconfirming information and potentially forming and maintaining belief in 
scopaesthesia.   
Although relationships between cognitive-perceptual factors and scopaesthesia belief 
were statistically significant, the positive correlations were small. Therefore, the 
predictive effects of these variables within this study should not be overstated. The 
inclusion of disorganised and interpersonal factors within the measure of schizotypy 
used (SPQ-B), could have weakened the correlation between schizotypy and 
scopaesthesia belief, as these factors do not play a role in the validation of unusual 
beliefs. Previous studies have shown only the cognitive-perceptual factors connected 
to positive schizotypy influence paranormal belief (Mohr et al., 2001; Dagnall et al., 
2017), whilst disorganised and interpersonal characteristics evidence no direct 
contribution to the formation of paranormal beliefs (Hergovich et al., 2008; Dagnall et 
al., 2010). It may be useful to include only positive schizotypy measures in future 
studies, to test the relationship when positive schizotypy is isolated.  
The correlation matrix evidences a strong positive correlation between belief in 
scopaesthesia and experience of scopaesthesia (H5). Although cause and effect 
cannot be established, it is clear that there is a strong relationship between the two 
Page 28 of 44  
  
factors. Further investigation could attempt to identify which is the predominant 
variable.  
Furthermore, results supported the final hypothesis of gender differences within 
scopaesthesia belief; showing females reported higher levels of belief in the 
phenomenon compared to men (H6). This supports previous studies which found 
similar gender discrepancies (Sheldrake, 2003) and also additional research 
highlighting that females express a greater general paranormal belief than males 
(Rice, 2003). Descriptions of scopaesthesia experiences found within the present 
study also support those presented by Sheldrake (2003), who found scopaesthesia 
occurred most with strangers in public places. These similar findings add further 
support towards the validation to the existence of the phenomenon.    
Implications of findings   
Role of anecdotal evidence   
There is much dispute within the area of scopaesthesia, but what is difficult to contest 
is the high prevalence of personal experience of the phenomenon, repeatedly reported 
throughout studies, including this one. However, this large body of anecdotal evidence 
is quick to be dismissed by the scientific community (Sheldrake, 2013), with questions 
surrounding the scientific plausibility of the anecdotal claims proposed (Moore and 
Stilgoe, 2009). Experiences and observations are often the beginning of scientific 
inquiry, so it seems counter-productive to disregard and discourage investigations into 
a phenomenon, due to the fact that scientific bodies cannot currently provide an 
explanation as to how it can occur.  With public opinions appearing to endorse and 
show interest in scopaesthesia, further exploration of the experience through scientific 
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investigations seems logical. Dismissal of this reportedly everyday phenomenon could 
potentially limit an expansion in scientific knowledge and understanding.     
Real-world applications    
Regardless of the absence of scientific explanations for scopaesthesia, belief in the 
phenomenon has been evidenced within professional practice.  An extensive series of 
interviews conducted by Sheldrake et al (2003) found that many police officers, 
surveillance personnel and soldiers were familiar with the ability of detecting remote 
stares. A number of detectives reported they were trained not to stare at people’s 
backs for longer than necessary, as the individual may detect this and notice the 
detective. Scopaesthesia was also reported to occur when observers were looking 
through binoculars or telephoto lenses. However, Blackmore (2005), comments how 
binocular lenses can have highly reflective surfaces, which can draw attention to the 
observer by conventional means. This said, these professions involve a lot of remote 
viewing and belief in scopaesthesia amongst these professionals remains high. These 
workers rely on being able to carry out covert operations, therefore if scopaesthesia is 
proven to exist, this would have implications within training (i.e. the most effective way 
to watch someone without this being detected through scopaesthesia).  
Furthermore, over the past decade, there has been a dramatic rise in CCTV around 
the world (Hu and Gong, 2017) and particularly in the UK (Baker, 2007). Systems used 
for surveillance by businesses and the government mean people are observed via 
CCTV on a daily basis (Sheldrake, 2005). With positive scopaesthesia effects being 
demonstrated to still occur through this medium (Radin, 2005), it could be said that the 
number of possible scopaesthesia experiences may be higher than ever. If the 
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phenomenon was to be genuine, this increase in scopaesthesia experiences could 
prompt a greater prevalence of scopaesthesia belief.  
Research limitations    
Self-report questionnaires  
This study relied exclusively on self-report measures, assessing only subjective 
evaluations of thinking styles and experience. Within the study background, 
participants were told that scopaesthesia is currently acknowledged as extrasensory 
perception. This paranormal affiliation may have created some respondents to answer 
items differently, as self-reports of paranormal belief can underestimate the actual 
level of belief due to social desirability (Zusne & Jones, 1989). Altered responses could 
have also been present in the R-PBS. This effect may have been heightened as the 
questionnaires were administered with associations to an academic institution, this 
may have caused participants to feel their convictions were likely to be met with 
disapproval (Genovese, 2005). Additionally, it has been previously noted that 
selfreport measures of reality testing may not reflect a true index of individual RT 
deficits (Irwin, 2003). Due to its complex and sub-conscious nature, a performance 
measure may be more beneficial in gaining genuine RT deficits scores than a self-
report questionnaire in future studies. The relationship between subjective perceived 
performance and actual performance is often weak, a common issue when 
metacognitive measures are employed (Denovan et al., 2017). This means that 
findings should be interpreted with precaution.  
Sample limitations    
Convenience sampling was employed in the present study. This method is useful for 
studies like this which have limited time and resources, as it is affordable and provided 
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easy accessibility to potential participants. However, using this method impedes the 
ability to draw inferences about scopaesthesia belief across the wider population. The 
sample possessed a fairly sufficient age range of 18-69 years, but gathered an 
unequal proportion of males (40) to females (133). With the present study and previous 
studies outlining a tendency for females to hold a greater belief in scopaesthesia, this 
could have compromised findings.   
Future Research   
Identification of further scopaesthesia correlates   
It is clear that belief in scopaesthesia cannot be fully explained in terms of the 
psychological correlates tested in this study; paranormal belief accounted for only 8% 
variance in the measure of scopaesthesia belief, with both cognitive-perceptual factors 
only presenting weak positive correlations with belief in scopaesthesia also. This 
indicates that other variables must influence the formation and maintenance of 
scopaesthesia belief; posing the question as to what other psychological factors may 
play a role.   
Mindfulness is described as the ability to be aware of the self; one’s thoughts, 
surroundings, internal - external stimuli and behaviours (Baer et al., 2006) and has 
been associated with paranoia and social anxiety, both of which have previously been 
shown to relate to scopaesthesia (Baker, 2015). This potential correlate has yet to be 
investigated as a predictor of scopaesthesia belief and experience in a peer-reviewed 
journal. Further investigation between these two concepts could be advantageous.    
An interesting future study could test a potential model for belief or experience of 
scopaesthesia, with the inclusion of additional variables. This would require a larger 
sample but would enable researchers to see how multiple psychological factors 
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influence scopaesthesia belief in combination. As the present study found that 
paranormal belief was a significant predictor of belief in scopaesthesia, it may be 
useful to consider a dual-influence model; investigating the effects of paranormal belief 
alongside another psychological variable and the extent to which both together relate 
to belief in scopaesthesia. For example, investigating belief in science alongside 
paranormal belief may provide more insight into the cognitive processes involved 
within scopaesthesia. Belief in science employs rational-critical thought, whilst belief 
in the paranormal uses intuitive-experimental thinking (Irwin et al., 2015). Investigating 
the influence of dual thinking processes in relation to scopaesthesia belief and 
experience may prove valuable.    
Valid scopaesthesia measure   
The development of an instrument to assess scopaesthesia belief accurately may be 
beneficial for future research. Although the one created and used in the present study 
held up as a good measure with no emerging problems, a measure used consistently 
within scopaesthesia research and investigations into psychological correlates would 
enable studies to be more easily compared and repeated.    
Conclusion  
Scopaesthesia continues to be a complex and intriguing issue, still insufficiently 
researched. Whilst the effects of paranormal belief and cognitive-perceptual factors 
were relatively minor in influencing belief in scopaesthesia, these psychological 
correlates provide a greater insight into what underlying aspects affect scopaesthesia 
belief and experience. This may well be the key to fully understanding of the 
phenomenon.   
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